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Resumo
Neste trabalho, estimamos os efeitos dos Programas Condicionais de Transferência de Renda (PCTR), 
no Brasil, sobre a oferta de trabalho de mulheres e homens adultos. Para tanto, utilizamos o painel de 
municípios que são continuamente cobertos pela Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD/
IBGE) durante o período entre 2001 e 2005. Os efeitos dos PCTR brasileiros são estimados tanto sobre a 
taxa de participação quanto sobre o número médio de horas trabalhadas. Como a PNAD não investiga 
diretamente a participação das famílias em PCTR, utilizamos um procedimento indireto para identificar as 
famílias beneficiárias desses programas. Nossos resultados indicam que os efeitos de interesse não são 
significativos tanto do ponto de vista estatístico como em termos de magnitude.
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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the effects of the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes in Brazil on the 
labour supply of adult males and females. We employ the panel of municipalities that are continuously 
investigated by the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD/IBGE) over the years 2001-2005. 
The effects of the Brazilian CCT programmes are estimated both on the participation rate and the mean 
number of hours worked. Since PNAD does not ask directly surveyed families about CCT programme 
participation, we use an indirect procedure to identify beneficiary families. Our results indicate that the 
effects of interest are not significant both on statistical grounds and in terms of magnitude.
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1  Introduction
In recent years, there has been a widespread diffusion of Conditional Cash 
Transfers (CCT) programmes in Latin America. As implied by their name, these 
programmes provide monetary grants to poor families conditional on the fulfilment 
of a set of requirements, such as keeping children at school and bringing them to 
regular visits to health clinics. In general, the stated objective of this type of pro-
gramme is twofold. The first is alleviation of current poverty, a goal that is pursued 
through the regular payments of benefits to recipient families. The second goal, 
which is based on the programmes' conditionalities, seeks to foster human capital 
accumulation of children so as to reduce long-term structural poverty. By now, 
many scholars and policy makers see CCT programmes as a model of social safety 
nets for the developing world. 
In trying to accomplish their objectives, CCT programmes may affect beneficiary 
families in many dimensions. These include the level and patterns of consumption, 
the health conditions of family members, investments in physical and human ca-
pital, and the labour supply of children and adults. In this paper, we focus on the 
effects of CCT programmes on the supply of labour of adults. Specifically, our 
objective is to measure CCTs' effects on the participation rate and number of hours 
worked by male and female adults in Brazil. Although the most relevant effects of 
CCTs are likely to pertain to their impacts on children, we believe investigating 
CCTs' impacts on adult labour supply is an important issue. Indeed, there is a 
general belief that CCT programmes produce the socially undesirable outcome of 
making beneficiary adults to work less. However, it has not been completely es-
tablished neither on theoretical nor on empirical grounds that CCTs provoke this 
adverse effect.
There are many different empirical strategies that can be used to investigate the 
effects of CCT programmes on adult labour supply. Ideally, one would like to count 
on a social experiment to compare the labour supply behaviour of the randomly 
assigned treatment and control groups. However, this is not available for most 
countries where CCT programmes have been implemented, including Brazil. In this 
situation, non-experimental methods must be used. In general, studies that rely on 
these methods employ individual data to find a comparison group that resembles 
the treatment group had the latter not received the programme. Our empirical 
method is also non-experimental, but instead of searching for a single compari-
son group we exploit the time-series-cross-section variation from a large sample 
of Brazilian municipalities to assess the effects of interest. Specifically, based on 
micro-data from a national, cross-section household survey (the Pequisa Nacional 
por Amostra de Domicílios - PNAD), we calculate sample means at the municipal 
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level for our outcome variables of interest (the participation rate and number of 
hours worked) and for a set of covariates, including a measure we develop for CCT 
programme participation. To obtain variation over time, we benefit from the fact 
that PNAD is annually fielded in the same set of municipalities between census 
years (only households are randomly sampled across years). Our sample period is 
2001-2005.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that uses aggregated data to 
assess the labour supply effects of CCT programmes. However, there are an incre-
asing number of studies that have employed individual level data to investigate this 
issue. Parker and Skoufias (2000) use experimental microdata from PROGRESA to 
estimate the effect of the programme on the participation rate of male and female 
adults at different points in time for distinct age groups, categories of workers, 
and definitions of the eligibility criteria. Point estimates were mostly positive for 
males and negative for females. However, except for a small set of age groups and 
points in time, most estimates were not significant on statistical grounds. They 
then conclude that there is no evidence that PROGRESA affects the labour force 
participation of adults. Ferro and Nicollela (2007) use microdata from PNAD 2003, 
which contained two specific questions on CCT programme participation: one for 
whether families were signed-up for any of the existing programmes at the time 
of the survey, and another for whether they were already receiving the program-
mes' transfers. They utilise these two pieces of information to create a treatment 
group (those receiving the benefits) and a control group (those enrolled but still 
not receiving the benefits). The authors estimate the effects of the Brazilian CCT 
programmes on both the participation rate and number of hours worked by male 
and female adults in urban and rural areas.  Their estimates of the programmes' 
effect on the participation rate are small in magnitude and statistically nil for both 
males and females in urban and rural areas. As for the estimates on hours worked, 
the results show a negative effect for males in urban and rural areas (but only sta-
tistically significant for the former area), a positive impact for urban women, and 
a negative effect for females in rural areas. Medeiros et al. (2007) use microdata 
from PNAD 2004 to estimate the effect of CCT programmes on the probability 
of being in the labour force for adult males or females. Results are obtained sepa-
rately for heads of families and spouses who live in families below the 30th per-
centile of the per capita family income distribution. They find that labour market 
engagement does not seem to be affected by participation in the programmes for 
almost all groups considered (the exception is female heads, for whom the effect is 
negative). Cedeplar (2006 apud MEDEIROS et al., 2007) use a non-experimental 
household survey that was specifically fielded in 2005 to evaluate the effects of 
the Brazilian CCT programmes on e.g., education, health, nutrition, and labour 
market outcomes. In terms of labour supply, they find a positive effect of Brazilian 
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CCTs on the participation rate of male and female adults. Using the 2004 version of 
PNAD, Tavares (2008) employs matching methods with different control groups to 
estimate the impact of CCTs on the labour supply of beneficiary Brazilian mothers. 
As in Ferro and Nicollela (2007), estimates are obtained for both the labour force 
participation and the number of hours worked. Regarding the former outcome, her 
results indicate a positive and statistically significant effect; as for the latter, the 
estimates change sign depending on the control group being used and tend not to 
be significant on statistical grounds.
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide a description of 
the Federal CCT programmes that have been implemented in Brazil in the last 
decade. The third section is dedicated to describe the data we use, including the 
procedure we adopt to identify CCT beneficiaries. In section 4, we briefly discuss 
how CCT programmes may affect the labour supply of adults. Since there are no 
aggregate models that connect the effects of CCT programmes on labour supply, we 
base our discussion on standard labour supply theory at the family level. Section 5 
presents our empirical methodology, which is based on different linear regression 
models that are typically used in the panel data literature. Results are presented 
in section 6 and are obtained separately by gender for two distinct samples: one 
that includes all individuals, and another for those individuals in families below 
the median per capita family income of the municipalities they live in. In the last 
section we present the main conclusions.
2  Description of Programmes 
Before October 2003, there existed five Federal CCT programmes in Brazil. The 
oldest was the Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI), which was 
launched in 1996, and whose aim was to eradicate child labour. It was targeted to 
families with children aged 7 to 15 years who were working (or at risk to work) in 
activities considered to be harmful for their health. The value of the programme's 
transfer was R$25 (US$37 PPP) per child in rural areas and R$40 (US$59 PPP) per 
child in urban areas. The programme's conditionalities required that children under 
16 years of age did not work and maintained at least 75% school attendance.
Three programmes were created in 2001. The Federal Bolsa Escola programme had 
as its target population those families with children aged 6 to 15 years and whose 
per capita income was less than R$90 (US$97 PPP). Its transfer was R$15 (US$16 
PPP) per child, up to a maximum of three children, that is, with an upper limit of 
R$45. The programme's conditionality stipulated that participant children had to 
attend school at least 85% of the school year. The Bolsa Alimentação programme 
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had as its goal the reduction of infant mortality in families whose per capita income 
was below half the value of the prevailing minimum wage. The transfer was R$15 
(US$16 PPP) per child under 6 years old, or pregnant woman, cumulative up to 
R$45. The conditionalities involved immunisation of young children and regular 
visits to health centres for pregnant and breast-feeding women. The last programme 
launched in 2001 was the so-called Auxílio-Gás. Targeted to families whose per 
capita income was lower than R$90 (US$97 PPP), it provided R$7.50 (US$8 PPP) 
as a subsidy to buy cooking gas. Auxílio-Gás only required that beneficiary families 
were registered in the so-called Federal government's Cadastro Único (Unified 
Register).
In the beginning of 2003, the Cartão Alimentação programme was created for fa-
milies with per capita income below half the minimum wage. It transferred R$50 
(US$54) to beneficiary families with the aim to reduce hunger to very low levels. 
The programme's grant had to be spent on food only.
In October 2003, the Federal government launched the Bolsa Família programme. 
It unified all previous CCT programmes, which were run by different agencies, had 
their separate information systems, and their own financing. Its target population 
consists of two groups of families. Families in extreme poverty (per capita income 
below R$50 (US$42 PPP)) receive a fixed transfer of R\$50. If there are children 
under 15 years old or pregnant women, these families also get R$15 (US$13 PPP) 
per child or pregnant woman, up to a maximum of R$45. The maximum amount 
is therefore R$95 for this group. The second group consists of families in moderate 
poverty (per capita income between R$50 (US$42 PPP) and R$100 (US$85 PPP)). 
Families in this group only receive the benefits if there are children less than 15 
years of age or pregnant women in the household. The transfer is the same as the 
variable part of the previous group, i.e. R$15 per child or pregnant woman, also 
cumulative up to R$45. For this group, the maximum amount is R$45. In terms 
of conditionalities, the programme requires 85% school attendance for school-age 
children, immunisation of children under 6 years old, and regular medical check-
ups for pregnant and breast-feeding women.
3  Data
All data we use in the empirical analysis come from the Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra de Domicílios – PNAD (National Household Survey). PNAD is fielded 
on a yearly basis (usually in October) and gathers information on demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics of every member of the household. We use data for 
the period 2001 to 2005. 
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PNAD is a cross-section survey, so we cannot follow households/individuals over 
time. However, its sampling scheme allows the construction of a time-series of 
cross-sections of municipalities in Brazil. This is because the municipalities that 
enter the sample are selected at the beginning of every decade and, though sampled 
households change across years, the same set of municipalities is kept constant wi-
thin that decade. We take advantage of this feature of the survey to construct our 
panel of municipalities. 
For the current decade, PNAD's sample contains 817 municipalities that can be 
partitioned in three groups: 139 are situated in metropolitan areas, 134 are not in 
metropolitan areas but have large populations, and 544 are smaller municipalities. 
Because the number of individual observations for some municipalities was small, 
we decided to join municipalities with less than 100 observations in one of these 
groups to a municipality that belonged to the same group in the same state of the 
country. Altogether there were 11 municipalities in this situation, so we work with 
806 municipalities that are followed over five years (total of 4030 time-series-
cross-section observations).  Table 1 displays the average, the minimum and the 
maximum number of individual observations across this set of municipalities over 
the sample period.
Table 1 – Number of Individual Observations in PNAD’s Municipalities by Year
Year Average Minimum Maximum
2001 458 107 11221
2002 466 106 12050
2003 465 104 11782
2004 470 103 11520
2005 483 103 12338
Source: Based on microdata from the PNADs.
All variables we use in the regression analysis are mean sample values at the muni-
cipal level. PNAD’s sample design does not guarantee that municipal samples are 
representative of their underlying parent populations.1 In particular, there may 
appear problems of inconsistency and lower precision for inference about the local 
population parameter values (e.g. the mean of a municipal variable). For regression 
purposes, like ours, these problems create measurement error in regression variables 
(specially covariates), an issue that tend to bias the estimation of regression para-
1  See Silva et al. (2002) for a description of PNAD sample design.
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meters. Fortunately, there are some methods that have been developed to remedy 
that, with the instrumental variable procedure, which is applied here, being one of 
the most widely used.2 In section 5 we discuss how we implement this method.
The PNADs’ data sets contain sampling weights for individual observations. We 
use these weights to compute descriptive statistics for the whole country. We also 
use these weights to compute the population size in each municipality for each year 
of our data. The total population of each municipality across the years is used as a 
fixed weight in all regressions we run.
Before presenting descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression analy-
sis, there is one important issue related to the way we identify individuals that 
receive CCT programmes in PNAD. We discuss it in the following subsection.
3.1  identifying beneficiaries of cct Programmes
In the main questionnaire of PNAD, there are no specific questions that explicitly 
ask whether interviewed households receive CCT programmes. In the lack of such 
direct information, we therefore created a procedure that tries to indirectly iden-
tify the beneficiaries of these programmes across the years. 
PNAD’s main questionnaire contains a set of questions in which the values of 
the different income sources a household may have are recorded. One of these 
questions refers to the value of household income that is obtained from both fi-
nancial assets (e.g. interests and stock market shares) and transfers from social 
programmes. Note that income from both sources is reported together. However, 
one should expect that those households that derive income from financial assets 
tend not to receive benefits from social programmes. Based on this hypothesis, 
we use the information provided in this specific question to identify CCT benefi-
ciaries. Specifically, our procedure makes use of the typical values of the benefits 
of CCT programmes to identify households that are (potentially) beneficiaries of 
these programmes. Table 2 presents the values typically transferred by each CCT 
programme.3 Since a household may receive transfers from more than one of these 
programmes, our procedure also uses the combination of these values to identify 
the beneficiary households. All values that were not equal to the typical values and 
2 See Fuller (1987) for a general presentation of other methods to solve measurement error 
problems.
3 It should be noted that in practice we use the values of R\$7 or R\$8 to capture the Auxílio-Gás 
programme. This is due to the fact that monetary values with decimal digits are not captured by 
PNAD.
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their combinations were treated as income from financial assets or from non-CCT 
programmes.4
Table 2 – Typical Values of Benefits Transferred by CCT Programme
Programme Benefit Value (R$)
PETI (per child) 25 (rural), 40 (urban)
Bolsa Escola 15, 30, 45
Bolsa Alimentação 15, 30, 45
Auxílio-Gás 7.50
Cartão Alimentação 50
Bolsa Família 15, 30, 45, 50, 65, 80, 90
Source: Barros et al. (2007, Table 6).
To validate our procedure, we take advantage of the fact that the 2004 version of 
PNAD included a special questionnaire that directly asked whether the household 
was participating in the Federal CCT programmes. Using the information provi-
ded by this special questionnaire as a reference, we then check if our procedure is 
consistent. Specifically, we calculate the proportion of recipient and non-recipient 
individuals of CCT programmes according to the special questionnaire and to our 
procedure. The results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 – Proportion of CCT Beneficiaries: Comparison between the Special 
Questionnaire and the Procedure of Typical Values – (%)
Special Questionnaire
Recipient Non-recipient
Recipient 18.4 2.2
Typical Values
Non-recipient 1.7 77.7
Source: Based on microdata from PNAD 2004.
There are four main results that can be extracted from Table 3. Firstly, around 96% 
(18.4+77.7) of individuals were identically classified by both criteria. Secondly, 
around 8% (1.7/(1.7+18.4)) of those individuals identified as recipients by the spe-
4 We also impose a restriction that the typical values and their combinations should be less than 
R$175.
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cial questionnaire were not classified as such by our procedure. In other words, 
approximately 92% of recipients were correctly identified by our proposed pro-
cedure. Thirdly, around 3% (2.2/(2.2+77.7)) of those classified as beneficiaries 
by our procedure were not identified by the special questionnaire. Finally, Table 
3 also reveals that programme participation is only slightly overestimated by our 
procedure. Indeed, while our procedure classifies 20.6% (18.4+2.2) of the popu-
lation as beneficiaries, this proportion is 20.1% (18.4+1.7) according to the special 
questionnaire.
Figures 1 and 2 present complementary evidence on the accuracy of our procedure. 
Still based on PNAD 2004, Figure 1 presents the proportion of individuals in each 
percentile of the per capita family income distribution that are recipients of CCT 
programmes. One of the curves in this Figure is based on our procedure, while 
the other is calculated from the information of the special questionnaire.5 Apart 
from revealing that the Brazilian CCT programmes were reasonably well targeted 
to the poor, Figure 1 evinces that our procedure seems to consistently classify the 
recipients of CCT programmes along almost the entire income distribution. As 
expected, our procedure tends to slightly overestimate programmes’ participation 
for richer individuals. 
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Source: Based on microdata from PNAD 2004.
Figure 1 – Percentage of CCT Beneficiaries across Percentiles of the Income 
Distribution: Special Questionnaire and Method of Typical Values
5 In order to smooth these curves, they are depicted as a moving average of ten percentiles. For 
example, the point corresponding to the 10th percentile represents the average of the 1st to the 
10th percentiles.
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As a final validation test of our procedure, we exploit two facts that are related 
to the historical evolution of CCT programmes in Brazil. The first is that all CCT 
programmes but one (namely PETI) started operating after 2001 (see Table 2). 
Hence, if our procedure is correct we should expect to detect fewer CCT indivi-
duals before that year. The second fact is that the coverage of CCT programmes 
progressively increased since 2001, so our procedure should be capable to detect 
this movement as well. Figure 2, which is solely based on our procedure, presents 
the evolution of the percentage of individuals along the per capita family income 
distribution for a set of years since 1999.6,7 As it can be seen from this figure, the 
two historical facts previously mentioned seem to be reasonably well captured by 
our proposed method: (1) the line corresponding to 1999 is almost flat; and (2) the 
lines corresponding to the years after 1999 are basically overlapped.
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Figure 2 – Percentage of CCT Beneficiaries across Percentiles of the Income 
Distribution: Method of Typical Values – Selected Years
Overall, we believe that the evidence presented in this subsection indicates that our 
proposed procedure is sufficiently accurate to measure CCT programme participa-
tion over time. Thus, in our regression analysis, the variable that we use to measure 
6 The PNAD questionnaire of 1999 is the same as that used in the following years.
7 As in Figure 1, the lines depicted in Figure 2 are also moving averages of ten percentiles.
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programme participation is based on this procedure. Specifically, in the regressions 
we use the proportion of beneficiary individuals at the municipal level.8
3.2  Descriptive statistics
As the labour supply effects of CCT programmes may be different for males and fe-
males, our empirical analysis is implemented separately by gender group. In addition, 
since the effects of interest may also vary across the different parts of the income 
distribution, results are obtained separately for the overall sample of each sex and for 
the samples of males and females from families below the median per capita family 
income of the municipality they live in (henceforth called below-median samples).9
The sample mean and standard deviation of the variables used in our regression 
analysis are presented in Table 4. Columns (2) and (3) display these statistics for 
the overall samples of females and males respectively, while columns (4) and (5) 
contain the estimates respectively for the below-median samples of females and 
males. Statistics are presented for all years combined (2001-2005). Almost all 
estimates are calculated for individuals of each gender group above the age of 15 
years. The exceptions are: (1) the proportion of children under 14 years old, for 
which there is no distinction between the sexes; (2) the proportion of beneficiaries 
of CCT programmes, which includes individuals of all ages and genders; and (3) 
the unemployment rate, which is calculated for individuals older than 15 years of 
both sexes together.
The first two rows of Table 4 display the estimates of the two response variables 
used in the regression analysis: the labour market participation rate (Row (1)) and 
the mean number of hours worked during the reference week of the survey (Row 
(2)).10 On average, women have lower participation rates and work fewer hours 
than men. This is observed for both the overall and the below-median samples. 
Also noticeable is that the participation rate and hours worked of poorer women 
tend to be smaller than those of the overall female sample. Interestingly, this is only 
observed for the number of hours worked in the case of males.
8 One may raise the question that we are also including recipient rich families in our measure of 
programme participation. Thus, we also calculated programme participation excluding all fami-
lies that were below the average (over the years) 75th and 90th percentiles of the family per capita 
income. At the municipal level, the correlation between our programme participation variable 
and the measure based on the 75th (90th) percentile is around 0,98 (0,99).
9 The reason for establishing the threshold at the median is that the sample size for some munici-
palities is not very large.
10 According to the concepts used in PNAD, an individual is considered employed if he/she works 
at least one hour in the reference week of the survey; an individual is considered unemployed 
if he/she did not work during the reference week but searched for a job in that week. In the 
calculation of the mean number of hours worked we included all jobs an individual may have and 
incorporated all individuals with zero hours.
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Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics: Mean of Variables for All Years (2001-2005)
Overall Sample Below-Median Sample
Variables Females Males Females Males
(2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Participation Rate 55.8 81.0 52.6 80.7
(9.1) (6.0) (11.8) (7.6)
2. Hours Worked 17.7 33.9 14.5 31.9
(3.7) (4.4) (4.3) (5.4)
3. Proportion of Beneficiaries 13.6 13.6 19.4 19.4
(16.0) (16.0) (22.1) (22.1)
4. Labour Earnings 194.0 464.3 31.8 85.3
(123.3) (253.5) (20.1) (39.9)
5. Non-Labour Earnings 91.2 102.4 14.4 12.4
(56.7) (74.1) (8.6) (9.5)
6. Unemployment Rate 9.5 9.5 15.1 15.1
(5.4) (5.4) (8.9) (8.9)
7. Proportion of Children Under 14 27.5 27.5 36.4 36.4
(5.2) (5.2) (6.5) (6.5)
8. Age 38.7 37.4 35.5 35.0
(2.7) (2.3) (3.0) (2.6)
9. Schooling 6.7 6.5 5.4 5.1
(1.6) (1.9) (1.3) (1.5)
10. Proportion of Married 52.0 56.0 53.2 59.0
(7.3) (5.7) (9.3) (7.7)
11. Proportion of Whites 54.0 51.8 45.9 44.3
(24.1) (24.3) (24.2) (24.2)
12. Proportion of Urban Population 85.3 83.7 82.1 80.5
(21.3) (22.8) (24.5) (25.9)
13. Proportion in Adm. Occupations 11.6 6.2 6.3 4.2
(6.6) (4.0) (6.1) (3.9)
14. Proportion in Service Occupations 31.0 11.9 44.5 14.1
(10.9) (5.8) (18.1) (9.1)
15. Proportion in Comm. Occupations 12.1 9.1 11.4 8.9
(5.8) (4.5) (8.0) (6.0)
16. Proportion in Other Occupations 45.2 72.7 37.8 72.8
Notes: Based on microdata from PNAD. The below-median samples (columns (4) and (5)) refer to 
individuals whose per capita family income is below the median family per capita income of 
their respective municipalities. All variables are mean sample values weighted by the sampling 
weights provided by PNAD. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Rows (4) and (5) are 
measured in R$ of September 2005 (deflator: Índice de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo IPCA/
IBGE) - Consumer Price Index).
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Row (3) displays the estimates for our variable of interest: the proportion of indivi-
duals that received benefits of CCT programmes. These estimates are based on the 
procedure described in subsection 3.1. As it can be seen, on average, around 14% 
of the population in all years of our sample was beneficiaries of CCT programmes. 
This figure increases to around 19% of the population that live in families whose 
per capita income falls below the median family per capita income of their respec-
tive municipalities.
Rows (4) and (5) shows the estimates of mean labour and non-labour income res-
pectively11 Labour earnings of women is substantially lower, on average, than that 
of men (ratio of around 0.43 for the overall sample, and approximately 0.38 for the 
below-median sample). Interestingly, this gap is not so high in terms of non-labour 
income. In fact, women in the below-median sample seem to get slightly more than 
men in this part of the distribution.
Row (6) shows that the unemployment rate of females is substantially higher than 
that of males for both samples we use. Also noticeable is that the incidence of 
unemployment is much higher for poorer males and females.
Rows (7) shows that children under 14 years old represent around 28% of the 
overall population and approximately 36% of the population below the median per 
capita income. Rows (8) and (9) show that women are slightly older and more edu-
cated than men. This is observed for both types of samples we are working with. 
Row (10) indicates that a lower proportion of women are married as compared to 
men. This difference is due to the larger size of the female population. As shown 
in Row (11), the proportion of white females is higher than that of males for the 
overall population, but this difference is smaller for those below median per capita 
income. Row (12) shows that the proportion of women living in urban areas is hi-
gher than that of men for both types of samples we are considering.
Rows (13) to (16) present the occupational composition for females and males. As 
it can be seen, the proportion of females in the first three categories (specially in 
service occupations) is higher than that of males.12
11 The measure of non-labour income does not include the value of transfers of CCT programmes. 
It includes the values of all other types of transfers available in the survey questionnaire such 
as pensions, rents, private transfers, capital income and benefits received from non-CCT pro-
grammes. These last two components correspond to all non-typical values (and their combina-
tions) of our procedure to identify beneficiaries of CCT programmes (see subsection 3.1).
12 Due to a change in the occupational codes used in PNAD from 2002 on, we were only able to 
construct four different occupational categories that seemed compatible over time: administra-
tive, service, commercial, and others. Because this last category includes the manufacturing 
industry, most males fall in that category.
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4  Some Theoretical Considerations
We are interested in the effects of CCT programmes on the labour supply of adults. 
Though our estimation of these effects is based on aggregate data, labour supply 
models at the individual/family level can provide useful insights about our effects 
of interest.13 In what follows, we use the reasoning of simple, static models of la-
bour supply at the micro level.
In a standard model of individual labour supply, the effect of programmes’ transfers 
constitutes a pure income effect: the extra income from programmes’ grants allo-
ws individuals to afford more of all goods. According to theory, the income effect 
should increase the demand for all normal goods, including both consumption and 
leisure (assuming the latter is a normal good). Hence, if adults allocate their time 
only between work and leisure, the standard individual model predicts that the 
effect of CCT programmes is unambiguously negative on the labour supply of 
adults.
However, given that CCT programmes are targeted to household units and impose 
conditionalities that restrict the time use of (some of) its members, a labour su-
pply model at the family level seems more appropriate than the individual model 
to enhance the understanding of our effects of interest. Indeed, in family models, 
the decisions on the supply of labour of each household member take into account 
the restrictions on and the inter-dependencies between the time allocation of all 
household members. 
Because programme grants are conditioned on children’s school attendance, the 
family model would predict that the shadow price (or relative value) of school rises, 
whereas the relative value of all other activities declines (say, work and leisure). 
This should lead to an increase in time allocated to school and a decrease in time 
devoted to all other activities together. In principle, it is unclear what the new com-
position of time dedicated these other activities will be (RAvALLION; WODON, 
2000). For instance, it is possible that there is no change in child labour, so the 
increase in schooling time comes at the expense of a reduction in children’s leisure. 
However, if there is a decline in the time children spend working, then there will 
be less available labour within the household.14 In that case, the relative price of 
labour inside the household tends to rise, which should lead to an increase in the 
13 The extensive theoretical literature on labour supply is fairly well developed for both the indi-
vidual and family units of analysis. However, the literature on more aggregate levels (e.g. munici-
palities, states, or countries) is scarce. See Killingsworth (1983) for a survey of first-generation 
models of labour supply, and Blundell and Macurdy (1999) for a review of more recent models.
14 Assuming that education and leisure are normal goods, the pure income effect from the pro-
grammes’ grants would produce a reduction in child work as well.
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labour supply of adults. Thus, given that the income effect operates in the other 
direction, the total effect of CCT programmes on adult labour supply becomes 
ambiguous.15
5  Methodology
We use various linear regression models to investigate the effect of CCT program-
mes on adult labour supply. We use a time series of cross-sections of 806 Brazilian 
municipalities that are followed over five years. This panel of municipalities is 
constructed from microdata of the 2001-2005 versions of PNAD (see section 3).
The effect of interest is assessed on two different variables: the participation rate 
and number of hours worked. The response variables and the covariates are descri-
bed in section 3. Results are obtained separately by gender group and for two types 
of samples: one in which all individuals of each sex are used to construct the sample 
means (overall sample), and another in which the sample means of the sexes are 
calculated only for individuals below the median per capita family income of their 
respective municipalities (below-median sample). It is important to point out that 
the use of sample means may create measurement error problems, an issue that is 
tackled through the application of instrumental variables methods.16
Consider the following equation for municipality j=1,...,J at time period t=1,...,T:
 yjt = α + pjtγ + x’1jtβ1 + x’2jβ2+ ηj + ujt  (1)
where y represents the response variable, p measures the proportion of individuals who 
are CCT beneficiaries, (x1,x2) are vectors of time-variant and time-invariant control 
variables respectively, η denotes unobserved municipality-specific effects, and u is a 
mean zero disturbance term that is assumed to be uncorrelated across municipalities and 
time periods but whose variance may be clustered at the municipal level. The parameter 
α is an intercept, γ is our parameter of interest, and (β1, β2) are conformable vectors of 
parameters respectively associated with the control variables in (x1,x2).
15 It should be pointed out that CCT eligibility criteria could also affect labour supply decisions 
within the household. Indeed, for CCT programmes that include periodic checks on family in-
come, it is possible that (some) adults choose to work less (or not to work at all) so as to meet the 
income eligibility criterion of programmes. Another point to be raised is that compliance with 
the programmes’ conditionalities may also affect the allocation of time within the family. For 
instance, complying with periodic clinic visits and school attendance of children may decrease 
the labour supply of some family members, especially women.
16 Another method to tackle error-in-variables problems in the context of time series of cross-
sections has been proposed by Deaton (1985). See also Fuller (1987) for a general approach to 
measurement error models.
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In total we estimate five different models. The first is simply pooled OLS. The 
second is the random effects model, which differs from pooled OLS in that it expli-
citly recognises the presence of municipality-specific effects, but assumes that they 
are uncorrelated with all covariates. This last assumption is relaxed in the fixed 
effect model, which is our third model.17 This model can be estimated through va-
rious methods, the most common of them being the within-groups transformation. 
Applied to equation 2 this transformation produces:
 jtjtjtjt uxpy ~~~~ 11
' +β+γ=   (2)
where the tilde notation denotes: jt jtω ω ω= − , with 
1
1
T
jtt
Tω ω−
=
= ∑ . Notice that 
all time-invariant elements of equation 1 are swept out by the within-groups trans-
formation, including the municipality-specific effects, ηj. In a small-T setting as 
ours, the fixed effects estimator of γ and β1 is consistent as long as there is strict 
exogeneity.18
Another common method used in the panel data literature is the first-differences 
transformation. Denoting ∆ωjt = ωjt - ωjt-1, equation 1 can then be expressed in first-
differences as:
 ∆yjt = ∆pjtγ + ∆x’1jtβ1 + ∆ujt   (3)
Note that because of the first difference transformation we loose one time period, 
so now t=2,...,T. Note too that the first-difference transformation also sweeps out 
all time-invariant elements of equation 1. Our fourth and fifth models are based 
on equation 3. The fourth model simply estimates that equation under the assump-
tion that there is strict exogeneity (see footnote 18). The fifth model relaxes strict 
exogeneity, allowing for the presence of correlation between the error term and the 
covariates.19 Within our context, this type of correlation (endogeneity) may arise 
from two basic sources. The first has to do with measurement issues. As discussed 
in section 3, since we measure our variables (in particular the regression covariates) 
at the municipal level, error-in-variable problems are likely to be present in our 
setting. The second is not related to measurement issues, but to more substantial 
(economic) factors. For instance, if there are relevant omitted variables in equation 
1, it is likely that the error term will be correlated with the included covariates.
17 We report the usual Hausman test to assess the appropriateness of the random effects 
specification.
18 That is: E[ujs | Zjt for all j, and for all s and t, where Zjt = (pjt, x1jt, x2j).
19 More formally, it assumes that for all j: E[ujs | Zjt] = 0 if s > t and E[ujs | Zjt] ≠ 0 if s ≤ t, where 
Zjt = (pjt,x1jt,x2j). Note that this assumption allows for contemporaneous correlation between the 
error term and the covariates.
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A typical approach to deal with the presence of endogeneity is the use of instru-
mental variables. The main requirements for instruments to be valid are that they 
are correlated with the endogenous covariates and at the same time orthogonal to 
the error term in the equation. Hence, given our assumptions, valid instruments 
for (∆pjt,∆x1jt) are (pj,t-2,…,pj1;x1j,t-2,…,x1j1). Note that the use of lagged instruments 
at time period t-2 implies that the fifth model is estimated for t=3,...,T. Since 
T=5, our model is over-identified, so we can apply the Sargan/Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions. The estimation method of the fifth model is the so-called 
two-step GMM, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).20
All models we estimate include year dummies. The standard errors of the models’ 
coefficients are estimated through the usual sandwich-type robust/clustered (at 
the municipal level) method.21 The municipal population summed over the years 
that are used in the corresponding models weights regressions. F-tests for the joint 
significance of the models’ coefficients are reported in the tables containing the 
regression estimates.
6  Results
We first present results for the participation rate and then for hours worked. For 
each sex, overall sample results are followed by below-median sample results.
6.1  Participation rate
6.1.1  Females
Regression results for the participation rate of all females are presented in Table 5. 
The coefficient of interest is the one corresponding to the variable proportion of 
beneficiaries. As this table shows, all point estimates of this coefficient are positive, 
though they are statistically significant only for the OLS and the random effects 
models. The Hausman test largely rejects the hypothesis that the random-effects 
specification is adequate. Indeed, as the following Tables will show, this hypothe-
sis is strongly rejected by the Hausman test for both sexes, samples, and response 
variables we use. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions does not reject 
the null for the validity of the instruments used in the GMM model. This will also 
be observed in most of the following tables.
20 It has been found in the panel data literature that the standard errors of the two-step GMM may 
be inaccurately estimated in finite samples. To correct for that we apply the method put forward 
by Windmeijer (2005).
21 It is worth noticing that this method deals with heteroscedasticity problems that are likely to be 
produced from the calculation of sample means at the municipal level in our data.
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Table 5 – Effect of CCT Programmes on the Participation Rate of Females: Overall Sample
Random Fixed First
Covariates OLS Effects Effects Difference GMM
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of beneficiaries 0.0604*** 0.0563*** 0.0145 0.0066 0.0438 
                                        (0.0224) (0.0136) (0.0165) (0.0160) (0.0629) 
Labour income (1/10) 0.0037*** 0.0049*** 0.0047*** 0.0026*** 0.0009 
                                        (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0021) 
Non-labour income (1/10) -0.0034*** -0.0028*** -0.0016*** -0.0009** -0.0027 
                                        (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0032) 
Unemployment rate 0.1209*** 0.1585*** 0.2390*** 0.0811*** 0.0605
                                        (0.0448) (0.0332) (0.0358) (0.0298) (0.1992) 
Proportion of children between 0-14 -0.0631 -0.0323 0.0471 0.0001 -0.1067 
                                        (0.0667) (0.0415) (0.0472) (0.0381) (0.2745)   
Age                                     0.0252*** 0.0171*** 0.0162*** 0.0097*** -0.0466*  
                                        (0.0059) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0255)   
Age square -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** 0.0005*  
                                        (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)   
Schooling                               0.0613*** 0.0337*** 0.0133 -0.0302* -0.0484   
                                        (0.0133) (0.0091) (0.0115) (0.0175) (0.0407)   
Schooling square -0.0041*** -0.0024*** -0.0005 0.0026* 0.0044   
                                        (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0029)   
Proportion married -0.0581* -0.0624*** -0.0743*** -0.0077 -0.0460   
                                        (0.0307) (0.0232) (0.0277) (0.0226) (0.1606)   
Proportion of whites -0.1094*** -0.0730*** -0.0692*** -0.0303* 0.0069   
                                        (0.0197) (0.0139) (0.0184) (0.0163) (0.1011)   
Proportion of urban population -0.0478** -0.1223*** -0.1447*** 0.0233 -0.0582   
                                        (0.0227) (0.0201) (0.0463) (0.0376) (0.2466)   
Proportion in administrative occupations -0.3698*** -0.2363*** -0.1455*** -0.0464* -0.0926   
                                        (0.0357) (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0243) (0.2081)   
Proportion in service occupations -0.3078*** -0.1895*** -0.0749*** -0.0470*** 0.1903   
Random Fixed First
                                        (0.0255) (0.0188) (0.0222) (0.0164) (0.1289)   
Proportion in commercial occupations -0.2698*** -0.1463*** -0.0425* 0.0023 -0.0136   
                                        (0.0341) (0.0238) (0.0258) (0.0206) (0.1799)   
F-test:                                 47.71 90378.07 35.84 1445.40 1.46   
P-value                                 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1030   
                                        
Hausman test: χ2 184.25
P-value                                 0.0000
                                        
Hansen test: χ2 79.43   
P-value                                 0.3414   
                                        
Number of observations 4030 4030 4030 3224 2418   
Notes: All variables are mean sample values computed from microdata from PNAD across the ye-
ars 2001-2005. The dependent variable is the proportion of individuals in the labour force 
at the municipality level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance levels: 
*** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. The models in columns (2) and (3) contain an intercept and 
dummies for geographical regions and metropolitan areas. The GMM model is estimated in 
first-differences and uses as instruments the levels of covariates lagged twice and earlier. All 
models contain year dummies. The municipal population summed over the years that are 
used in the regressions weights regressions.
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To assess the magnitude of the effect of interest we can calculate its elasticity 
at the mean values of (y,p) = (0.558,0.136). Taking the point estimates at face 
value, their average equals approximately 0.04, which gives an elasticity of around 
0.01. This implies that a 10% increase in the proportion of CCT beneficiaries 
would raise the female participation rate in 0.1%, which is a very small impact. 
Hence, we may conclude that the effect of the Brazilian CCT programmes on 
the female participation rate does not seem to be significant either in magnitude 
or on statistical grounds. 
The effects of labour and non-labour income are respectively positive and nega-
tive, and statistically significant across almost all models (the exception is the 
GMM estimate22). These are the expected signs. Indeed, there is abundant em-
pirical evidence that shows that higher labour earnings affect positively the sup-
ply of labour (see e.g. BLUNDELL; MACURDy, 1999). Also, higher non-labour 
earnings can be seen as a pure income effect, so we would expect a negative 
impact of this variable on labour supply.23 Interestingly, higher unemployment 
rates seem to increase the participation rate of women. This may be due to 
women’s decision to enter the labour force when their husbands become unem-
ployed. Though not statistically significant, most estimates of the coefficient 
associated with the proportions of children in the municipality are negative. 
Hence, if anything, this may be indicating that children care activities inhibit 
women from participating in the labour market. Except for the GMM results, 
age seems to increase participation of women but at a decreasing rate. Similar 
results are observed for the schooling effect. Being married impacts negatively 
the labour force participation of females, a result that might be due to a lower 
necessity to work for married women. 
A higher proportion of white females appears to be associated with lower parti-
cipation rates. To the extent that labour supply decisions of black women may be 
affected by expectations of racial discrimination in the labour market, this result 
is unexpected. Some estimates of the effect of the proportion of females that 
live in urban areas are negative, whereas others are positive or statistically nil. In 
principle, the sign of this effect is ambiguous: on the one hand, urban areas tend 
to have more diversity in employment opportunities, which should lead to higher 
levels of labour force participation; on the other hand, rural individuals tend to 
help out in farm chores, a fact that should lead to lower participation levels in 
22 Since instrumental variable estimation typically involves some loss of efficiency, it is not uncom-
mon to lose statistical significance in this type of estimation.
23 A recent study for Brazil (REIS; CAMARGO, 2007) shows that non-labour earnings from pen-
sions impact negatively the participation rate of men and women.
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rural areas. As for the occupational composition, most estimates indicate that 
higher shares of women in administrative, service, or commercial occupations 
tend to decrease female labour market participation (as compared to the excluded 
miscellaneous occupational category).
Table 6 reports the results for the participation rate of the below-median sample 
of females. Overall, the estimates of the effect of interest are quite similar to 
those obtained for the sample of all females. This is observed both in terms of 
the magnitude of the point estimates and in terms of statistical significance. 
Using the average of the point estimates (approximately 0.04), the elasticity of 
the effect of interest [calculated at the mean values of (y,p) = (0.526,0.194)] 
is around 0.01, implying that a 10% increase in the proportion of CCT benefi-
ciaries in Brazil would rise by 0.1% the participation rate of females whose per 
capita income is below the median per capita family income of the municipali-
ties they live in. As in the case of all females, we may conclude that CCT pro-
grammes do not seem to significantly increase the participation rate of poorer 
females.The results for the rest of the covariates are also similar to those of the 
overall sample of females. What seems somewhat different is the higher mag-
nitude of the impact of labour and non-labour income, and the unemployment 
rate.
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Table 6 –  Effect of CCT Programmes on the Participation Rate of Females: Below-
Median Sample
' Random Fixed First
Covariates OLS Effects Effects Difference GMM
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of beneficiaries 0.0765*** 0.0603*** 0.0160 0.0146 0.0120
                                        (0.0186) (0.0124) (0.0134) (0.0123) (0.0654)
Labour income (1/10) 0.0370*** 0.0450*** 0.0490*** 0.0270*** 0.0279*
                                        (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0152)
Non-labour income (1/10) -0.0104*** -0.0088*** -0.0081*** -0.0022 0.0015
                                        (0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0249)
Unemployment rate 0.1891*** 0.2524*** 0.3513*** 0.1524*** 0.3810*
                                        (0.0377) (0.0267) (0.0290) (0.0243) (0.2274)
Proportion of children between 0-14 -0.0415 0.0249 0.1098** 0.0132 -0.2617
                                        (0.0611) (0.0426) (0.0452) (0.0367) (0.2957)
Age                                     0.0301*** 0.0192*** 0.0135*** 0.0092*** -0.0358
                                        (0.0051) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0284)
Age square -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** 0.0003
                                        (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)
Schooling                               0.0279 0.0069 -0.0134 -0.0006 -0.0517
                                        (0.0172) (0.0115) (0.0133) (0.0179) (0.0464)
Schooling square -0.0020 -0.0010 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0048
                                        (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0048)
Proportion married -0.1180*** -0.0607*** -0.0261 0.0190 -0.1301
                                        (0.0302) (0.0235) (0.0252) (0.0213) (0.2014)
Proportion of whites -0.1243*** -0.0620*** -0.0315* -0.0109 0.1162
                                        (0.0197) (0.0148) (0.0168) (0.0148) (0.1205)
Proportion of urban population -0.1131*** -0.1684*** -0.1090*** -0.0077 -0.3002*
                                        (0.0234) (0.0198) (0.0295) (0.0254) (0.1706)
Proportion in administrative occupations -0.3820*** -0.2567*** -0.2126*** -0.0659** 0.0287
                                        (0.0401) (0.0314) (0.0300) (0.0261) (0.2953)
Proportion in service occupations -0.2414*** -0.1721*** -0.0991*** -0.0532*** -0.0450
                                        (0.0194) (0.0142) (0.0159) (0.0120) (0.1154)
Proportion in commercial occupations -0.2147*** -0.1214*** -0.0526** -0.0109 -0.1398
                                        (0.0274) (0.0226) (0.0232) (0.0181) (0.1569)
F-test:                                 49.07 48281.49 43.30 897.82 1.57
P-value                                 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0647
                                        
Hausman test: χ2 224.05
P-value                                 0.0000
                                        
Hansen test: χ2 90.85
P-value                               0.1027
                                        
Number of observations 4030 4030 4030 3224 2418
Notes: See Table 5. The below-median sample refers to females who are below the median per capita 
family income of the municipalities they live in.
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6.1.2  Males
Table 7 presents the results for the participation rate for the overall sample 
of males. All point estimates of the effect of interest are positive and, except 
for the GMM case, also statistically different from zero at conventional levels. 
Calculated for the average of the point estimates (approximately 0.03) and at 
the mean values of (y,p) = (0.810,0.136), the implied elasticity here is around 
0.005. This implies that a 10% increase in the proportion of CCT beneficiaries 
would raise the male participation rate by 0.05%. Though very small in mag-
nitude, here we may conclude that the impact seems positive and statistically 
significant.
The effects of labour and non-labour income are respectively positive and nega-
tive, though they seem to be smaller in absolute value than those obtained for 
all females. The unemployment rate seems to increase the participation rate of 
males, a result that has also been observed for women. In fact, the effects of the 
other covariates tend to be similar to what has been observed for the other gen-
der group. The main exception is the variable proportion married, whose effect 
seems to be positive in the case of males. This may be due to the fact that males 
feel more compelled to be in the labour force when they are married.
Table 8 displays the results for the participation rate of the below-median sample of 
males. Estimates of the effect of interest are similar to those of the overall sample 
of males: all point estimates are positive and, except for the GMM, also statistically 
significant. Using again the average of the all point estimates (approximately 0.04) 
and the mean values of (y,p) = (0.807,0.194), the elasticity is around 0.01, implying 
that a 10% increase in the proportion of CCT beneficiaries would lead to a 0.1% in 
the participation rate of poorer males. Though this impact is somewhat higher than 
that obtained for all males, it is still quite small.
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Table 7 –  Effect of CCT Programmes on the Participation Rate of Males: Overall 
Sample
Random Fixed First
Covariates OLS Effects Effects Difference GMM
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of beneficiaries 0.0390*** 0.0391*** 0.0193** 0.0274*** 0.0146
                                        (0.0104) (0.0076) (0.0090) (0.0102) (0.0515)
Labour income (1/10) 0.0010*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0006*** 0.0001
                                        (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005)
Non-labour income (1/10) -0.0022*** -0.0020*** -0.0012*** -0.0005** -0.0006
                                        (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0014)
Unemployment rate -0.0398 0.0174 0.1368*** 0.0795*** 0.0451
                                        (0.0264) (0.0212) (0.0232) (0.0213) (0.1457)
Proportion of children between 0-14 -0.0312 0.0107 0.0952*** 0.0026 -0.2121
                                        (0.0376) (0.0280) (0.0352) (0.0265) (0.1977)
Age                                     0.0249*** 0.0253*** 0.0271*** 0.0143*** 0.0377**
                                        (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0152)
Age square -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0005***
                                        (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Schooling                               -0.0037 -0.0027 -0.0012 0.0450*** -0.0324
                                        (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0062) (0.0101) (0.0234)
Schooling square -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0035*** 0.0021
                                        (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0016)
Proportion married 0.1404*** 0.0979*** 0.0381* 0.0373** 0.0591
                                        (0.0213) (0.0172) (0.0196) (0.0174) (0.1351)
Proportion of whites -0.0387*** -0.0158* -0.0360*** -0.0058 -0.0185
                                        (0.0099) (0.0083) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0723)
Proportion of urban population -0.0657*** -0.0945*** -0.1326*** -0.0242 -0.0623
                                        (0.0097) (0.0089) (0.0222) (0.0204) (0.1672)
Random Fixed First
Proportion in administrative occupations -0.0731** -0.0462 -0.0163 0.0059 -0.0977
                                        (0.0361) (0.0304) (0.0314) (0.0285) (0.1979)
Proportion in service occupations -0.1128*** -0.0618*** 0.0155 -0.0798*** 0.3057*
                                        (0.0208) (0.0185) (0.0199) (0.0213) (0.1622)
Proportion in commercial occupations -0.1544*** -0.0987*** -0.0102 -0.0181 -0.2891*
                                        (0.0284) (0.0226) (0.0237) (0.0206) (0.1562)
F-test:                                 114.15 569505.77 31.74 6905.91 1.85
P-value                                 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0195
                                        
Hausman test: χ2 208.10
P-value                                 0.0000
                                        
Hansen test: χ2 52.77
P-value                                 0.9760
                                        
Number of observations 4030 4030 4030 3224 2418
Notes: See Table 5.
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Table 8  –  Effect of CCT Programmes on the Participation Rate of Males: Below-
Median Sample
Random Fixed First
Covariates OLS Effects Effects Difference GMM
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of beneficiaries 0.0566*** 0.0503*** 0.0193** 0.0372*** 0.0280
                                        (0.0082) (0.0067) (0.0081) (0.0092) (0.0491)
Labour income (1/10) 0.0100*** 0.0108*** 0.0131*** 0.0079*** 0.0033
                                        (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0046)
Non-labour income (1/10) -0.0265*** -0.0279*** -0.0236*** -0.0122*** -0.0134
                                        (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0101)
Unemployment rate 0.0396* 0.0784*** 0.1990*** 0.1051*** 0.0726
                                        (0.0205) (0.0179) (0.0216) (0.0175) (0.1174)
Proportion of children between 0-14 0.0084 0.0824*** 0.1780*** 0.0572** 0.1658
                                        (0.0313) (0.0279) (0.0330) (0.0275) (0.1878)
Age                                     0.0180*** 0.0181*** 0.0155*** 0.0129*** 0.0430***
                                        (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0153)
Age square -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0005***
                                        (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Schooling                               -0.0194*** -0.0111** -0.0055 0.0486*** -0.0086
                                        (0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0064) (0.0077) (0.0255)
Schooling square 0.0015*** 0.0010** 0.0009 -0.0049*** 0.0015
                                        (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0024)
Proportion married 0.1327*** 0.1044*** 0.0831*** 0.0272* -0.0729
                                        (0.0178) (0.0159) (0.0185) (0.0163) (0.1118)
Proportion of whites -0.0500*** -0.0297*** -0.0379*** -0.0204** 0.0168
                                        (0.0100) (0.0087) (0.0119) (0.0103) (0.0748)
Proportion of urban population -0.0894*** -0.1099*** -0.1194*** -0.0386*** -0.1153
                                        (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0161) (0.0134) (0.1154)
Proportion in administrative occupations -0.0668* -0.0672** -0.0163 -0.0412 -0.0054
                                        (0.0365) (0.0336) (0.0350) (0.0313) (0.2100)
Proportion in service occupations -0.0534*** -0.0359** 0.0119 -0.0586*** 0.1881
                                        (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.1268)
Proportion in commercial occupations -0.1326*** -0.1128*** -0.0333 -0.0265 -0.2972**
                                        (0.0226) (0.0219) (0.0237) (0.0186) (0.1399)
F-test:                                 96.02 424969.57 49.42 5397.55 2.31
P-value                                 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020
                                        
Hausman test: χ2 157.90
P-value                                 0.0000
                                        
Hansen test: χ2 63.20
P-value                                 0.8325
                                        
Number of observations 4030 4030 4030 3224 2418
Notes: See Table 5. The below-median sample refers to males who are below the median per capita 
family income of the municipalities they live in.
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Similar to the comparison between the two samples of females, here it is also no-
ticeable that labour income, non-labour income, and the unemployment rate have 
higher impacts (in absolute value) than those observed for overall sample of males. 
The rest of the results are also similar between the two samples of males.
6.2  hours Worked
We now discuss the regression results for the case in which the response variable is 
the mean number of hours worked at the municipal level. It is important to recall 
that this variable has been measured including those individuals that worked zero 
hours (i.e. the unemployed and those out of the labour force). This implies that 
shifts in our measure of the mean number of hours worked are driven either by 
changes in the proportion of individuals with zero hours or by changes in the mean 
of strictly positive hours of work.
More formally, let h denote the individual labour supply of hours, π the proportion 
of individuals with h=0, and µ* = E[h | h > 0] the mean of the distribution of 
strictly positive hours. Then, the mean number of hours worked can be written as: 
µ = E[h] = π. E[h | h=0] + (1-π) . E[h | h > 0] = (1-π).µ*. Thus, µ can be affected 
either by changes in π or in µ*.
CCT programmes may directly affect both π and µ*.24 For example, π can vary be-
cause these programmes may make some of those who are out of the labour force 
to find a job. Also, µ* can change because these programmes may directly affect 
the supply decisions of hours of those already employed. Moreover, changes in π 
can indirectly affect µ*. For instance, using the previous example, if the group of 
newly employed individuals (i.e. those who moved from out of the labour force) 
has average hours below (above) the initial µ*, then we should observe a decrease 
(increase) in µ*.
It is not straightforward to connect the effects of CCT programmes on the supply 
of hours and the participation rate. First, there is an intrinsic relationship between 
the proportion of individuals with zero hours of work and the participation rate.25 
Since CCT programmes may trigger movements of individuals across the different 
labour market statuses (employment, unemployment, and inactivity), it is possible 
that: (1) the participation rate and proportion of zero-hours individuals change in 
24 For simplicity we omit conditioning variables in the notation for π and µ*. It should be under-
stood, however, that π = Pr[h=0 | p, X] and µ* = E[h | h>0, p, X], where p denotes programme 
participation and X represent a vector of control variables.
25 To see this, denote by P the population over 15 years of age, and let it be partitioned into three 
groups: those who are employed (e), those who are unemployed (u), and those who are out of the 
labour force ( f ). Denoting the participation rate by r, we can thus write: r = (e+u)/P and π = 
(u+f )/P, which clearly shows that two variables are inter-related.
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different directions; (2) one of them does not change at all; (3) they both change 
in the same direction.26 Second, as discussed in the previous paragraph, the mean 
of strictly positive hours (µ*) may be indirectly affected by changes in proportion 
of individuals with zero hours of work. In this sense, since the participation rate 
and the proportion of zero-hours individuals are intertwined, this channel also 
contributes to make the link between total labour supply of hours (i.e. µ) and the 
participation rate less direct. In fact, in order to investigate empirically the con-
nection between the effects of CCT programmes on these two variables, it seems 
necessary to develop a method that is capable of isolating the programmes' effects 
on the set of all relevant variables that affect the total labour supply of hours. This 
task is beyond the scope of this paper, though. 
6.2.1  Females
Table 9 reports the results for the overall sample of females. As it can be seen from 
this Table, all point estimates of the effect of interest are negative, with three out 
of five being statistically significant. In terms of magnitude, if we take the average 
of all estimates (approximately -1.6), the elasticity [calculated at the mean values of 
(y,p) = (17.7,0.136)] is around -0.01. This implies that the impact of a 10% increase 
in the proportion of CCT beneficiaries would reduce in 0.1% the mean number of 
hours worked by females. Though negative, this appears to be a small impact.
It is interesting to note that the effects of the Brazilian CCT programmes on the 
mean number of hours worked and the participation rate of females seem to be 
different. Indeed, the evidence shows that the impact is approximately nil on the 
participation rate of women but negative on their supply of hours. As discussed 
before, since there are various different channels through which these two effects 
may be connected, it is difficult to offer an explanation for this result.
The signs of the effects of the other covariates are similar to those found for the 
participation rate. A noticeable exception is the unemployment rate, whose effect 
on hours is negative.
26 The previous example can provide a case in which these variables move in opposite directions. 
Indeed, using the notation of footnote 25 and assuming that P is constant, a movement from 
part of f into e decreases π and increases r. Assuming again that P is constant, an example in 
which only one of these variable does not change value (namely r) would occur if there is move-
ment between u and e with f fixed. Finally, if there is an expansion in P that leads solely to an 
increase in u, we should observe both r and π moving in the same direction (specifically they 
both increase).
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Table 9 – Effect of CCT Programmes on Hours Worked of Females: Overall Sample
Random Fixed First
Covariates OLS Effects Effects Difference GMM
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of beneficiaries -1.4585** -1.0271*** -0.6524 -2.6266*** -2.3830
                                        (0.6205) (0.3617) (0.5379) (0.6191) (2.0709)
Labour income (1/10) 0.1961*** 0.2005*** 0.2194*** 0.1158*** 0.1068
                                        (0.0210) (0.0088) (0.0170) (0.0136) (0.0793)
Non-labour income (1/10) -0.1307*** -0.1075*** -0.0684*** -0.0400** -0.0207
                                        (0.0202) (0.0141) (0.0184) (0.0166) (0.1163)
Unemployment rate -18.5929*** -16.7559*** -15.2628*** -8.7690*** -16.2545**
                                        (1.5306) (0.9785) (1.0829) (1.1643) (8.0390)
Proportion of children between 0-14 -2.8796 0.9053 2.1828 3.3829* -3.8405
                                        (2.3694) (1.3244) (1.6180) (1.7691) (10.7241)
Age                                     1.0411*** 0.8222*** 0.7663*** 0.4442*** -1.3847
                                        (0.2005) (0.1229) (0.1464) (0.1384) (0.8700)
Age square -0.0141*** -0.0109*** -0.0099*** -0.0054*** 0.0151
                                        (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0096)
Schooling                               3.0372*** 1.2467*** 0.1818 -4.4180*** -0.8848
                                        (0.4223) (0.2603) (0.4361) (0.6282) (1.2524)
Schooling square -0.2314*** -0.0860*** 0.0171 0.3738*** 0.0873
                                        (0.0350) (0.0206) (0.0339) (0.0496) (0.0905)
Proportion married -5.0810*** -4.9810*** -5.6113*** -2.9856*** -4.9769
                                        (1.0301) (0.7787) (0.8706) (0.9573) (7.0995)
Proportion of whites -0.6220 -0.9371** -1.3794** -1.1175** 0.1409
                                        (0.5693) (0.4101) (0.5537) (0.5621) (3.9200)
Proportion of urban population 0.5451 -1.7028*** -3.6178** 0.2405 6.3285
                                        (0.8091) (0.5571) (1.4299) (1.4168) (9.3572)
Proportion in administrative occupations -9.1480*** -3.8009*** -1.6881* -0.6317 -2.0769
                                        (1.2446) (0.8515) (0.9729) (0.9999) (6.8999)
Proportion in service occupations -5.8759*** -0.0395 2.6156*** 1.2695* 6.8951
                                        (0.8517) (0.5300) (0.7103) (0.6481) (4.3442)
Proportion in commercial occupations -3.8321*** 0.7889 2.4720*** 1.5014* 5.9166
                                        (1.1287) (0.7430) (0.8385) (0.8376) (6.2977)
F-test:                                 64.35 2042.76 50.46 959.02 2.10
P-value                                 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0057
                                        
Hausman test: χ2 214.60
P-value                                 0.0000
                                        
Hansen test: χ2 68.62
P-value                                 0.6851
                                        
Number of observations 4030 4030 4030 3224 2418
Notes: All variables are mean sample values computed from microdata from PNAD across the years 
2001-2005. The dependent variable is the mean number of hours worked at the municipality 
level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 
10%. The models in columns (2) and (3) contain an intercept and dummies for geographical 
regions and metropolitan areas. The GMM model is estimated in first-differences and uses 
as instruments the levels of covariates lagged twice and earlier. All models contain year 
dummies. The municipal population summed over the years that are used in the regressions 
weights regressions.
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Table 10 contains the results for the below-median sample of females. All 
point estimates of the effect of interest display a negative sign, but only one 
of them is statistically significant at the 10% level.27 From the average of the 
point estimates (approximately -0.47), the elasticity [calculated at the mean 
values of (y,p) = (14.5,0.194)] is close to -0.01, implying that a rise in 10% in 
the proportion of CCT beneficiaries would lead to a reduction in -0.1% in the 
mean number of hours worked by females below the their respective munici-
palities’ median per capita income. Once again, the impact is quite small. In 
contrast to the case of all females, here the effect of interest does not seem 
to be statistically different from zero. Hence, for this sample, the effects on 
both the participation rate and the supply of hours are not significant either 
statistically or in magnitude.
In terms of sign, the effects of the other covariates are in line with those 
obtained for the overall sample of females. The magnitude of the effects asso-
ciated with labour and non-labour income is higher (in absolute terms) for the 
below-median sample of females. The opposite applies for the unemployment 
rate.
27 Here, the validity of the orthogonality conditions of the GMM model is not rejected only at the 
5% level by the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.
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Table 10 – Effect of CCT Programmes on Hours Worked of Females: Below-Median 
Sample
Covariates OLS Effects Effects Difference GMM
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of beneficiaries -0.2359 -0.0932 -0.1971 -0.8286* -1.0153
                                        (0.5610) (0.3043) (0.4015) (0.4226) (1.7312)
Labour income (1/10) 1.7796*** 2.0554*** 2.2308*** 1.2844*** 1.3591***
                                        (0.0907) (0.0511) (0.0930) (0.0860) (0.4421)
Non-labour income (1/10) -0.6066*** -0.5466*** -0.4880*** -0.0318 -1.1543*
                                        (0.1355) (0.0864) (0.0972) (0.0964) (0.6048)
Unemployment rate -11.6967*** -9.3645*** -7.9904*** -3.9574*** -14.2965***
                                        (1.0357) (0.7218) (0.7478) (0.8010) (5.0715)
Proportion of children between 0-14 0.9797 4.1298*** 5.3883*** 3.9187*** 2.2846
                                        (1.9722) (1.1460) (1.4268) (1.3168) (2.2126)
Age                                     1.0684*** 0.5867*** 0.4510*** 0.2745** 0.5995***
                                        (0.1717) (0.1058) (0.1160) (0.1140) (0.1696)
Age square -0.0127*** -0.0076*** -0.0060*** -0.0032** -0.0067***
                                        (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0024)
Random Fixed First
Schooling                               1.9203*** 0.4189 0.0061 -1.3598** -0.4065
                                        (0.5245) (0.2821) (0.4503) (0.5877) (0.6940)
Schooling square -0.1969*** -0.0731*** -0.0317 0.1164** 0.0358
                                        (0.0484) (0.0275) (0.0423) (0.0557) (0.0695)
Proportion married -7.9715*** -4.4348*** -3.3059*** -0.3785 -6.7331***
                                        (1.0388) (0.6575) (0.8067) (0.7410) (1.8405)
Proportion of whites -1.2109** -0.3970 0.2897 -0.2827 -0.0106
                                        (0.5789) (0.4033) (0.4789) (0.4838) (0.7250)
Proportion of urban population -1.6817** -3.0585*** -1.3986 0.6730 -1.5359
                                        (0.7914) (0.4893) (0.9756) (0.8464) (1.3863)
Proportion in administrative occupations -9.7746*** -4.2795*** -2.5795*** 0.0624 1.9328
                                        (1.2427) (0.9255) (0.9756) (0.9279) (1.5897)
Proportion in service occupations -5.0698*** -1.2654*** 0.0039 0.2418 0.8091
                                        (0.5741) (0.3762) (0.4425) (0.3984) (0.6367)
Proportion in commercial occupations -4.8685*** -1.5492*** -0.4474 0.3100 1.5322
                                        (0.8028) (0.6006) (0.6592) (0.6192) (1.0069)
F-test:                                 82.58 2990.05 76.99 615.18 9.13
P-value                                 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
                                        
Hausman test: χ2 188.41
P-value                                 0.0000
                                        
Hansen test: χ2 106.24
P-value                                 0.0686
                                        
Number of observations 4030 4030 4030 3224 2418
Notes: See Table 9. The below-median sample refers to females whose family per capita income is 
below the median family per capita income of the municipalities they live in.
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6.2.2  Males
Table 11 presents the results for hours worked for the overall sample of males. 
Apart from OLS, all other models’ estimates of the effect of interest are positive. 
However, only one estimate is statistically different from zero at conventional le-
vels. Taking the average of all estimates (approximately 0.73), the elasticity [com-
puted at the mean values of (y,p) = (33.9,0.136)] is less than 0.01. This implies 
that increases in the proportion of CCT beneficiaries in Brazil would have no (or 
negligible) effects on males’ mean supply of hours.
Contrasting the estimates for the participation rate and for the mean supply of 
hours, there is a distinction as compared to the female case. There the former 
effect is basically nil, while the latter is negative; here the former effect is positi-
ve, while the latter is nil. Hence, in term of sign, it seems that the Brazilian CCT 
programmes do not change the labour supply of hours of males but increase their 
participation rate; in contrast they decrease the supply of hours of females without 
affecting their participation rate. In all cases, however, it should be pointed out 
that, if there are any effects at all, they are quite small in magnitude.
As in the case of all females, the signs of the effects of the other covariates are 
similar to those found for the participation rate. Again, a noticeable exception is 
the unemployment rate, whose effect on hours is negative.
Table 12 displays the results for the below-median sample of males. All five point 
estimates of the effect of interest are positive, but only one is significant on statisti-
cal grounds. The implied elasticity using the average of all estimates (approximately 
1.43) and the mean values of (y,p) = (31.9,0.194) is around 0.01, implying that a 
10% increase in the proportion of beneficiaries would rise the mean number of 
hours worked for this group of males in 0.1%. As in the case for all males, the re-
sults indicate that the Brazilian CCTs increase the participation rate for this sample 
but have no (or negligible) effects on the their mean labour supply of hours.
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Table 11 – Effect of CCT Programmes on Hours Worked of Males: Overall Sample
Covariates OLS Effects Effects Difference GMM
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of beneficiaries -0.6309 0.2766 0.5778 1.6025** 1.8281
                                        (0.6899) (0.5126) (0.6402) (0.6381) (2.1012)
Labour income (1/10) 0.0827*** 0.0611*** 0.0563*** 0.0473*** 0.0457
                                        (0.0078) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0302)
Non-labour income (1/10) -0.0932*** -0.0879*** -0.0481*** -0.0229 -0.0728
                                        (0.0145) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0806)
Unemployment rate -27.7628*** -24.5796*** -19.7568*** -9.7300*** -30.4398***
                                        (1.6085) (1.2719) (1.3293) (1.4121) (7.7795)
Proportion of children between 0-14 -1.6475 0.6947 4.9978** 0.3146 1.8819
                                        (2.3585) (1.7397) (1.9476) (1.8773) (3.2170)
Age                                     1.9424*** 1.7164*** 1.6313*** 0.7985*** 1.7843***
                                        (0.1839) (0.1423) (0.1617) (0.1547) (0.2353)
Age square -0.0246*** -0.0219*** -0.0208*** -0.0105*** -0.0217***
                                        (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0026)
Schooling                               0.9259** 0.4320 -0.6429* 2.4243*** -0.8057
                                        (0.4092) (0.3101) (0.3641) (0.6685) (0.5156)
Schooling square -0.1620*** -0.0817*** 0.0599** -0.2161*** 0.0826*
                                        (0.0319) (0.0247) (0.0296) (0.0540) (0.0451)
Proportion married 8.8246*** 7.6752*** 5.5037*** 3.4944*** 5.3435***
                                        (1.4599) (1.1112) (1.2113) (1.1591) (1.7212)
Proportion of whites -0.6144 -0.3354 -1.4747** 0.6491 1.2221
                                        (0.6248) (0.5302) (0.6768) (0.7562) (0.9646)
Proportion of urban population -2.6690*** -4.0697*** -5.3394*** 1.3547 -4.6355**
                                        (0.6542) (0.6137) (1.3309) (1.4253) (1.8585)
Proportion in administrative occupations -6.9284*** -5.1490*** -3.8760** -0.2570 -3.1583
                                        (2.1265) (1.7767) (1.8579) (1.9048) (2.7311)
Proportion in service occupations -3.1937** -1.3307 2.0506* -6.9829*** 0.0742
                                        (1.2785) (1.0607) (1.1958) (1.4229) (1.7723)
Proportion in commercial occupations -5.7593*** -2.8844** -0.4422 -0.4121 -1.3148
                                        (1.6566) (1.3667) (1.3226) (1.3163) (2.0391)
F-test:                                 119.35 194570.28 57.08 2059.64 19.27
Random Fixed First
P-value                                 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
                                        
Hausman test: χ2 164.97
P-value                                 0.0000
                                        
Hansen test: χ2 93.74
P-value                                 0.2665
                                        
Number of observations 4030 4030 4030 3224 2418
Notes: See Table 9.
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Table 12 –  Effect of CCT Programmes on Hours Worked of Males: Below-Median 
Sample
Covariates OLS Effects Effects Difference GMM
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of beneficiaries 0.1889 0.5721 0.4952 1.9569*** 3.9159
                                        (0.6241) (0.3626) (0.5378) (0.6033) (3.0073)
Labour income (1/10) 0.7198*** 0.7960*** 0.9192*** 0.6193*** 0.5107*
                                        (0.0464) (0.0333) (0.0504) (0.0465) (0.2670)
Non-labour income (1/10) -1.4850*** -1.2628*** -1.0316*** -0.5550*** -1.5068**
                                        (0.1342) (0.0916) (0.1161) (0.1078) (0.6385)
Unemployment rate -23.7888*** -19.2739*** -16.1634*** -7.2695*** -25.0366***
                                        (1.1812) (0.8785) (1.0346) (1.0580) (7.1113)
Proportion of children between 0-14 2.2966 7.3479*** 10.9509*** 3.5647** 2.4448
                                        (2.1057) (1.4950) (1.8815) (1.7471) (10.5554)
Age                                     1.0450*** 0.8368*** 0.7720*** 0.5959*** 0.8997
                                        (0.1660) (0.1273) (0.1516) (0.1310) (1.0601)
Age square -0.0120*** -0.0104*** -0.0100*** -0.0073*** -0.0130
                                        (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0125)
Schooling                               0.1290 -0.2306 -0.5773 2.8554*** -3.9238**
                                        (0.4372) (0.2622) (0.4201) (0.5969) (1.6795)
Schooling square -0.0775* -0.0269 0.0336 -0.3153*** 0.3835**
                                        (0.0403) (0.0257) (0.0390) (0.0584) (0.1533)
Proportion married 9.1814*** 8.4658*** 7.6056*** 3.6438*** 6.6646
                                        (1.1707) (0.9111) (1.1098) (1.0218) (6.6278)
Proportion of whites -1.9426*** -1.5269*** -0.9816 -0.0553 2.4732
                                        (0.6133) (0.4695) (0.6410) (0.6762) (4.7626)
Proportion of urban population -3.7431*** -5.4487*** -6.5568*** -0.3385 -4.0523
                                        (0.6359) (0.4724) (0.9724) (0.8717) (8.4539)
Proportion in administrative occupations -8.5585*** -5.6829*** -3.5420** -3.0668* 3.5352
                                        (1.9003) (1.6951) (1.7826) (1.6932) (15.5984)
Proportion in service occupations -1.2544 0.1267 1.2425 -6.0490*** 1.1845
                                        (0.9113) (0.7978) (0.9254) (1.0356) (8.5430)
Proportion in commercial occupations -5.0585*** -3.1426*** -1.7711 -1.2735 -11.0825
                                        (1.3133) (1.0440) (1.2104) (1.1060) (9.0792)
F-test:                                 126.64 3939.71 98.42 1252.43 3.05
P-value                                 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
                                        
Hausman test: χ2 112.01
P-value                                 0.0000
                                        Random Fixed First
Hansen test: χ2 96.17
P-value                                 0.0504
                                        
Number of observations 4030 4030 4030 3224 2418
Notes: See Table 9. The below-median sample refers to males whose family per capita income is 
below the median family per capita income of the municipalities they live in.
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Overall, the effects of the other covariates are similar to those obtained for all 
males. Main exceptions are the impacts of labour and non-labour income, which 
are higher in absolute terms.
7  Conclusions
In this paper, we estimated the effects of the Brazilian CCT programmes on the 
labour supply of adults. These effects were estimated from a time-series-cross-
section sample of municipalities in the country. We constructed this data set from 
the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios - PNAD, which is a national 
household survey that is fielded annually in the same set of municipalities between 
census years (only households are randomly sampled across years). The outcome 
variables were the participation rate and the average number of hours worked at the 
municipal level. Since PNAD does not ask direct questions about CCT program-
me participation, we constructed an indirect measure of programme assignment 
that was based on the typical values of the programmes’ transfers to beneficiary 
households. Results are obtained separately for all males and females and, in order 
to investigate whether the effects of interest differ for poorer individuals, we also 
obtained results for males and females that live in families whose per capita income 
falls below the median per capita family income of the municipalities they live in. 
Methodologically, we employ various linear panel data models typically used in 
this literature.
Our results indicate that the impact of the Brazilian CCT programmes on the fe-
male participation rate is not significant either on statistical grounds or in terms of 
magnitude. This is observed for all females and for those below the median income. 
As for males, there is evidence that the effect on the participation rate is positive, 
though very small in magnitude. Again, this is observed for all males and for those 
below the median income. In terms of the supply of hours, the results indicate a 
small negative effect on all females but an insignificant impact on those that live 
below the median income. For both groups of males, the results show insignificant 
impacts of the programmes both in size and on statistical grounds. 
In sum, our results do not show significant effects of the Brazilian CCT program-
mes on either the labour market participation or the supply of hours of men and 
women. Rather, our results seem to be compatible with a story that CCT pro-
grammes do not affect the labour supply of adult males and females. In fact, this 
contention seems to be in line with the empirical literature that uses individual 
data and compare treatment and control groups’ outcomes.
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